Agents need an identity, and your IT department will say no
Damian Flynn · Microsoft MVP, Azure · Innofactor
Damian Flynn
Practice Lead & Principal Consultant (Azure), Innofactor
30+ years in enterprise IT · cloud since 2009 · Mayo, Ireland
Azure Infrastructure as Code · Azure Networking · 17 years an MVP
I asked IT for an identity for my agent.
They said no.
No MFA, so it's a risk flag. Every request like it has been refused.
So my agent runs as me.
Your IT department isn't wrong to say no.
It's missing a way to say yes.
Your agent is wearing your face
What actually happens when your agent signs in
the human
Nothing new was created. There is nothing to register.
Two populations, two control points
Managed / workload identity, Agent ID
Control the agent: registry, owner, scope, recertification, cost per agent.
Copilot, IDE agents, local harnesses
Control the client app: consent, conditional access, device, downscoped or on-behalf-of tokens. Log app ID + user.
Every over-permissioned account is now an automation platform
The agent's ceiling is the human's ceiling.
Your access debt now runs at machine speed.
What our CISO sees
Credentials with no human
An app identity can't do MFA, so it's a risk flag
Agents with no owner
The builder leaves; the agent keeps running
Agents nobody can name
He can count thousands; he can't name them
MCP is a black box
Weak logging, untested restores. Policy: "no MCP"
A "no" without a mechanism just moves the risk
Personal access tokens, API keys in .env files, agents on laptops.
The traffic still happens, just where nobody can see it.
One front door
token
identity
Back doors closed: Foundry keys off, agents get no direct RBAC. Entra in, PAT out.
Whose permissions does it have?
It can do no more than the caller
Owner = the caller. The safer default. If the delegation isn't granted: refuse, or ask out of band.
It has its own rights
Now you need RBAC for who may ask it to do what. Prompt injection is risk #1: a ticket says "delete the hub".
The back door you already have
One token. It can comment and close.
Whoever holds it can do both, and GitHub records that you did it.
Agents, one front door, five calls
What the gateway logged
Three layers
"Draft a message" → "send a message" is a permission change, not a feature
Every change in authority gets a version, an approver and evidence.
From "no MCP" to a yes with conditions
"No MCP, please."
One approved exception. Everyone else waits, or goes round it.
"MCP only through the gateway."
With an owner, an identity, an allow-list and a log. The exception became the pattern.
Monday morning
- List which apps can request tokens on behalf of your users
- Close one PAT back door behind a gateway
- Write a one-page contract for one agent
Your IT department isn't wrong to say no.
Give it a way to say yes.
damianflynn.com · github.com/damianflynn · linkedin.com/in/damianflynn